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Abstract 
 
Motivated by recent public policy debates on the role of market discipline in banking 
stability, I examine the impact of greater bank disclosure in mitigating the likelihood of 
systemic banking crisis.  In a cross sectional study of banking systems across 49 
countries in the 90s, I find that banking crises are less likely in countries with financial 
reporting regimes characterized by (i) comprehensive disclosure (ii) informative 
disclosure, (iii) timely disclosure and (iv) more stringent auditing.  
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I.  Introduction 
Although banking crises
1 have been a common feature of banking systems for a long time 
– the  U.S. alone experienced eleven banking panics between 1800 and the beginning of the 
World War I (Baim and Calomiris (2001)) – the crises of recent times have been rather severe.  
The cost of bailing out troubled banks in a banking crisis ranges between 20 and 50 percent of a 
country’s GDP, with a resolution time that can extend up to nine years (Honohan and 
Klingebial(2000)
2.  Hoggarth and Saport (2001) report the average fiscal costs of banking crisis 
resolution to be 16% of GDP, and the cumulative real output losses from banking crises to be 
above 17% of GDP.  As an example, Indonesia incurred 50% of its GDP in resolving the 1997 
crisis.  Banking problems are also believed to be at the center of the recent financial upheaval 
that engulfed emerging and transition economies (Caprio and Klingebial (1996)).  
These financial crises of the late 1990s coupled with recent corporate scandals around the 
world have brought to the fore the public debate on the need to strengthen market discipline 
through greater disclosure and transparency.  Enhanced transparency via greater disclosure of 
accurate and timely information about banks is believed to improve market discipline, which 
could reduce the likelihood of banking crisis.  This paper investigates empirically the impact of 
greater disclosure and transparency on banking system stability. 
The role of disclosure and transparency to banking system stability is not well 
understood, however.  Economic theory provides conflicting predictions about the benefits of 
greater disclosure.  The ‘Disclosure-Stability’ view holds that greater disclosure and the 
consequent transparency facilitates efficient allocation of resources by improving market 
discipline. Increased transparency permits greater market discipline whereby strong banks are 
rewarded for their risk management and performance and weak banks are penalized with higher 
                                                 
1I use banking crisis to mean systemic banking crisis.  Banking instability refers to existence of adverse impact from dysfunctions 
in the banking system or the risk thereof (Canoy et al (2001), and encompasses both individual bank instability (bank failure), 
and banking crisis.  The former refers to a failure of a financial institution, and the latter describes the situation where an 
individual financial institution failure leads to many simultaneous failures of other financial institutions. This is different from 
‘contagion’ where an individual failure leads to ‘one or more sequential failures’.  Banking crisis could be ‘systemic’ or 
borderline.  ‘Systemic’ banking crises are episodes of crises where most or all bank capital in the system is exhausted (Caprio and 
Klingebial (1996).  I provide the detailed criteria by which I classify banking crisis in section II below. 
2 By contrast, the U.S. banking crisis of the Great Depression of the 1930s, when almost a quarter of U.S. banks bankrupted, the 
negative net worth of the failed banks was only 3 percent of GDP (Beim and Calomiris (2001)).Other countries had similar 
histories of both infrequent banking crises and low cost of banking collapse. In the pre World-War I era, the countries that 
experienced major banking crisis include Argentina (in 1890), Australia (1893), Brazil (1892), Italy (1893) and Norway (1901), 
but the negative net worth of their failed banks never exceeded 1 percent of GDP, nor the costs of cleaning up exceeded 10 
percent of GDP.  In fact, countries such as Canada, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and Sweden avoided banking crisis 
completely during that era (Beim and Calomiris (2001)).   2
costs of raising capital and deposits, thereby enabling early detection of weak banks before they 
drag the entire banking system into crisis.  That is, market discipline provides incentives for 
banks to manage their risk prudently and operate efficiently, thereby reducing the severity and 
frequency of bank failures.   
On the other hand, the ‘Disclosure-fragility’ view holds that disclosure may lead to 
interpretation of specific information about banks’ financial conditions unjustifiably as indicator 
of widespread problems in the banking system, thereby leading to bank runs or stock market 
collapse (Calomiris and Mason (1997), Gilbert and Vaughan (1998) and Kaufman (1994)).   
Disclosure of financial problems at a bank may lead to the bank’s failure through a bank run.  It 
may also lead to an overreaction in the financial markets jeopardizing the ability of the bank to 
raise capital.  This lack of investor confidence could spread to the entire banking system, causing 
systemic banking failure.   In that case, rather than providing market discipline to improve 
resource allocation, more disclosure and transparency leads to the collapse of the banking system 
causing in failure of both strong and weak banks alike. 
The theoretical ambiguities about the impact of greater disclosure on bank stability are 
reflected in the public policy debate and the reluctance of countries in adopting pro-disclosure 
policies.  International organizations such as the Basle Committee, the World Bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund recommend countries to enhance the transparency of their banking 
sectors by improving disclosure. Yet, despite these calls, disclosure and transparency is not 
always the hallmark of banking sector reform policies in all countries.  Japan, for example, while 
undergoing a long period of banking crisis in recent years, adopted a policy of less disclosure in 
the midst of its banking crisis.  Since 1998, banks in Japan are required to report securities at 
book rather than at market value (understating liabilities), to provide own estimate of market 
value of real estate holdings, and to net loans and deposits to same customers (underreporting 
risk) [Jordan et al. (1999)].     
The study of bank disclosure and bank performance is especially important in light of the 
ongoing public policy initiatives that rely on disclosure and transparency as a centerpiece of 
regulatory reforms in the banking sector.  The Basel committee is finalizing a framework for 
bank capital adequacy for the new century.  The New Basel Capital Accord relies on minimum 
capital requirement (pillar 1) and supervisory review of bank assessment of capital relative to 
risk (pillar 2), complemented by market discipline via greater disclosure requirements (pillar 3)   3
(see BCBS (2003)).   By providing flexibility for banks in measuring their risk and capital 
adequacy, the New Accord brought market discipline into focus as a supplemental tool in bank 
capital regulation.   
Despite its importance in banking sector policy and the surrounding theoretical 
ambiguity, there is little cross-country empirical evidence on disclosure and bank fragility.  For 
the U.S., Jordan et al. (1999) examine the impact of disclosing supervisory information on 
troubled U.S. banks during financial crisis, and report that doing so does not lead to 
destabilization of the banking system. Baumann and Nier (2003) examine the relation between 
disclosure and bank capital and risk, and report an inverse relation between disclosure and bank 
risk-taking.  They do not study banking crises, however.  There is a growing empirical literature 
on banking crises; yet the literature does not address the role of disclosure and transparency.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Beck et al. (2003) investigate respectively the role 
of macroeconomic stability and banking regulation in banking crisis. Cull, Senbet and Sorge 
(2003) and Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) examine the relations between deposit 
insurance design features and banking crises.  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004) explore the 
relation between bank regulation and banking crisis, but they do not address the issue of 
disclosure and transparency directly. In the context of the effectiveness of regulation, they 
examine the degree of private monitoring on bank performance and fragility. They find that 
while private monitoring increases bank performance, it has no association with bank fragility, 
and pose the issue as a puzzle.  I focus on financial disclosure and audit stringency as part of the 
private monitoring, and find that this has indeed a robust positive role in fostering bank stability. 
The paper studies the impact of increased bank disclosure requirements and stronger 
auditing regulatory regime on the likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis based on data 
on 49 countries over the period 1990 through 1997.  I examine the impacts of both overall 
improvements in disclosure, including its comprehensiveness, timeliness and informativeness, as 
well as disclosure of specific items relevant to the ability of outside investors to assess bank risk 
and capital adequacy. Similarly, I examine the impacts of improvements in overall external 
auditing stringency, thus the credibility of disclosure, and of the specific regulatory requirements 
that improve audit effectiveness.  To draw accurate inferences about the impact of disclosure and 
audit stringency on bank crisis, I control for a number of factors that may influence banking 
fragility.  I control for differences in the macro economic environments of banks, the overall   4
institutional quality of countries, and for differences in bank market structure, such as the degree 
of competition, concentration, ownership structure, capital regulations, entry regulations, and 
restrictions on bank activity. 
I find that the likelihood of systemic banking crisis is lower in countries with regulations 
that require (i) more comprehensive disclosure, (ii) more informative (i.e. accurate) disclosure, 
and (iii) more timely disclosure. I find that the likelihood of banking crisis is lower in countries 
whose banks provide more comprehensive information both in the core standard financial 
statements and in the supplemental notes. Countries with disclosure requirements for more 
supplemental financial information are less likely to suffer from banking crises.  Specifically, 
banking crisis is less likely in countries that require disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions.  
I find that the likelihood of banking crisis is lower in countries that require a more accurate 
presentation of financial information in general and an accurate presentation of non-performing 
loans in particular. Consolidated financial reporting is considered to be more accurate (or 
informative) presentation, and I find that regulations that require consolidated financial reporting 
for related bank activities are associated with greater likelihood of banking system stability. 
Moreover, I find that banking system stability is enhanced by the timeliness of the financial 
reporting. The more frequent financial reporting, the less likely is banking crisis, all things 
constant.   
The impact of greater banking disclosure to banking stability appears to be economically 
significant.  An increase in bank disclosure by one standard deviation reduces the likelihood of 
banking crisis by about 3.5% per annum.  In cost terms, applying this probability to the 
cumulative output loss of a typical banking crisis episode, the benefit translates to a saving of 
about ½ a percent of GDP.  These results are not driven by reverse causality and are robust to a 
battery of sensitivity checks. 
I find that the likelihood of systemic banking crisis is also lower in countries that require 
more stringent external auditing of bank financial reporting.  In particular, banking crisis is lower 
in countries where external auditing is made a strong tool of bank supervision by requiring 
auditors to report to the supervisory agency, and where permitting auditors to meet supervisory 
agency without the consent of the auditee enhances auditor independence.  Alternatively, in 
addition to disclosure comprehensiveness, informativeness and timeliness, disclosure credibility 
(as measured by external audit stringency) enhances banking system stability.  I find that audit   5
stringency is complementary to bank disclosure in that the contribution of audit stringency to 
banking system stability is in addition to the benefit of bank disclosure.   
Overall, the finding is consistent with the ‘disclosure-stability’ view.   While 
improvements in disclosure in many dimensions are found to be either associated with greater 
bank stability or to have no significant relation to stability, I do not find greater disclosure to be 
related to bank fragility.  In terms of current public policy, the results provide an empirical 
support for the New Accord’s initiative in requiring greater disclosure as a source of banking 
system stability.  Going forward, however, to enhance the benefits of greater disclosure, the 
results emphasize the importance of improving the credibility of financial reporting as well.   
While expanding the scope of bank disclosure, the New Accord fails to provide verification 
requirements beyond those required for financial reporting, and security registration.  The results 
underscore the value of external auditing stringency in improving transparency and promoting 
bank stability.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides a detailed description of 
the data and the methodology. Section III presents the main results and Section IV provides 
additional robustness tests.  Section V provides discussion and concluding remarks. 
 
II.  Methodology and Data 
  A. Methodology 
  I examine the relation between disclosure and banking fragility using a multivariate logit 
model.  I estimate the probability that a systemic banking crisis will occur in a particular country 
in a particular time assuming this probability is a function of a set of explanatory variables of 
interest, X, and control variables, Z.  Let Crisisit be an indicator variable that takes 1 if country i 
is in a systemic banking crisis in year t, and 0 otherwise. Let Pit be the probability (conditional) 
that systemic crisis occurs in country i in period t.  The natural log of this likelihood of crisis 
given the explanatory variables, where β and λ are vectors of parameters to be estimated and 
F(Xitβ;Zitλ) is the cumulative logistic distribution evaluated at (Xitβ;Zitλ), is given by, 
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where, X is a vector of variables of interest and includes variables representing disclosure 
requirements and auditing regulatory requirements; and, Z is a set of control variables that 
include variables representing the banking industry structure, the quality of overall institutions 
and the macro-economic environment of countries.  
  In modeling the likelihood of crisis, I use the logistic function as the underlying 
probability distribution
3.  This conforms to earlier studies of banking crises (see, for example, 
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2002)).  In this logit specification, the estimates of the coefficients β and λ 
do not represent a marginal effect on the likelihood of crisis for a unit change in the underlying 
independent variable.  Rather, the coefficients measure an increase in the log of the odds ratio, 
ln[Pit/(1-Pit)], and this quantity depends on the  values of the independent variables at which the 
likelihood is evaluated.  A change in the independent variables will have different (nonlinear) 
effects on the likelihood of crisis depending on the initial crisis probability. 
  B. Variables 
 
  Crisis, the dependent variable, is an indicator variable that takes 1 if a country has 
undergone systemic banking crisis in the period 1990 through 1997.  I construct the variable 
primarily based on the database of Caprio and Klingebial (2003), which provides comprehensive 
information on episodes of banking crisis since the 1970s for a large sample of countries.  I 
supplement this information from data in Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) particularly in 
dating the episodes.  Systemic crises are, in general, episodes in which most or all bank capital in 
the banking system is exhausted.  Consistent with previous research (Caprio and Klingebial 
(2003), Barth et al. (2004), Demirguc-Kunt (1998)), episodes are considered systemic if non-
performing assets account for more than 10% of total assets or rescue cost amount to more than 
2% of GDP or the crisis involved large scale nationalizations or the crisis involved bank runs 
where emergency measures are taken. I identify 22 such episodes in the 1990s (see Appendix I).  
I focus on the 1990s because I have data on disclosure and transparency – my independent 
variables – only for this period.   
                                                 
3 I also use a probit model for robustness. No discernable differences shown between the two sets of estimates. On theoretical 
ground, there is no basis to prefer logit over probit and vice versa; they both are widely used in empirical economic research.   7
  I use two sets of explanatory variables (the vector X), in addition to a set of control 
variables (the vector Z), to explain incidence of systemic banking crises (Crisis).  These are data 
on (1) the regulation of disclosure practices, and (2) the regulation of auditing practices of banks.  
Regulation of Disclosure Practices:  Disclosure is mandated in all countries, and the 
respective supervisory body sanctions the minimum set of disclosure requirements.  Data on 
disclosure requirements is obtained from a recent database on bank supervision and regulation 
maintained by the World Bank (Barth, et al. (2001). The database is constructed based on 
surveys of national bank regulatory and supervisory authorities in 1998 and 1999.  I utilize the 
survey responses on issues of disclosure and auditing to construct indices of bank disclosure, 
disclosure informativeness and external audit stringency.   
Bank Disclosure: the focal variable of interest, Bank Disclosure, measures the extent 
and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks, and, specifically measures 
whether bank financial reports include information on bank risk management practices, 
accurately presents non-performing loans, presents a full picture of bank activity by reporting 
consolidated financial statements and presents comprehensive information by reporting off-
balance sheet transactions.  The variable is constructed as a principal component of four 
indicator variables: (i) an indicator variable with value 1 if banks are required to disclose risk 
management procedures to the public; (ii) a dummy variable that takes 1 if the regulation 
requires that accrued income on non-performing loans (NPL) should not be reported in the 
bank’s income statement; (iii) an indicator variable that takes 1 if consolidated financial 
statements of bank and non-bank financial subsidiaries are required; and (iv) an indicator 
variable that takes 1 if off balance sheet items need to be disclosed to the public.  
Non-reporting of NPL provides a more accurate representation of the financial health of 
the bank; consolidated financial statements are considered to be comprehensive; reporting off-
balance sheet transactions provides a more complete picture of the conditions of the bank; and 
reporting risk management procedures enable investors to assess the risk profile and valuation of 
the bank better.  Hence, these variables quantify good disclosure practices in specific areas of 
financial reporting.  Moreover, each measure corresponds to the specific recommendations on 
disclosure by the Basel Committee’s New Accord.   To the extent that increased disclosure 
results in greater transparency and the consequent market discipline, the variable Bank 
Disclosure will be associated with lower rate of bank fragility.  If, on the other hand, increased   8
disclosure causes misinterpretation and panic, the variable could be associated with greater 
fragility. 
Disclosure Informativeness:  measures the degree to which bank disclosure accurately 
represents the financial conditions of banks. For example, reporting interest income from non-
performing loans as part of bank income overstates the true economic performance of the bank, 
as does the selective reporting of bank activities.  Disclosure Informativeness is measured by 
aggregating whether non-performing loans are accurately presented and whether banks are 
required to present their bank and non-bank activities in a consolidated financial statement.  It 
represents the principal component of the variables NPL and Consolidate. 
Disclosure Timeliness: measures the degree to which bank disclosure is close to the 
decision time-point of potential users of the information.  This is a function of the frequency with 
which information is available to users.  Using survey data of accounting reporting practices 
around the world by the Center for International Financial Accounting Research (CIFAR), 
Bushman et al. (2003) constructs an index of the average frequency and comprehensiveness of 
interim reports for a sample of 60 countries. The frequency of interim reporting is a matter of 
disclosure regulation (CIFAR (1995). I use this index as a proxy for disclosure timeliness.   
Supplemental Reporting:  measures the extent of supplementary information (vis-a-vis 
the core financial statements) as required by countries’ regulation.  Out of the variables that 
constitute  Bank Disclosure, I construct a new variable that summarizes the extent of 
supplemental information by aggregating the requirement that banks provide information on risk 
management practices and the requirements for reporting of off-balance sheet transactions to the 
public.  Supplemental Reporting is a principal component of Risk and Off-Balance Sheet. 
In addition to these specific disclosure related variables, I also consider a variable to 
measure the degree of legal sanctions against bank officials for nonconformance to these 
regulations.  The new variable, Director Liability, aggregates (i) an indicator variable that takes 
the value 1 if directors in that country are legally liable for misleading information, and (ii) a 
variable that takes 1 if those legal sanctions have actually been enforced against directors in 
recent years.   
Table 1 and 2 provide a summary of these variables.  The disclosure variables exhibit 
wide variation across countries. Bank disclosure is negatively correlated with incidence of   9
banking crisis (though the relation is not statistically significant). The same is true of the relation 
between crisis and disclosure informativeness, timeliness and supplemental information.   
Regulation of Audit Practices:  The role of external auditors is critically important in 
bank disclosure.  The benefit of disclosure is that it enables investors (market participants) to 
make accurate assessment of the firm’s financial condition.  In their loan decisions, banks collect 
private information from their customers.  However, banks are reluctant to disclose proprietary 
information about their customers, making it difficult for outsiders, without access to individual 
loan information, to assess the health of the bank. This is more so in banks that lend to small 
firms which do not publicly disclose their information. Bank examiners and auditors have access 
to bank’s individual loans and the banks’ risk management practices.  Hence they play an 
important role in validating the financial information disclosed by the banks.   
Bank supervisory authorities regulate audit practices. Data on audit practices is obtained 
from the World Bank database on bank supervision and regulation (Barth et al. (2004)). I use 
survey responses on seven different audit practice measures to construct an aggregate index of 
external auditing stringency. 
External Audit Stringency, the focal variable of interest, measures the degree to which 
external audits are independent, professional and rigorous as reflected by the regulations that 
govern bank-auditing practices.  Specifically, it measures the stringency of external audit in 
terms of whether external audit is compulsory, whether the scope of external audit is mandated, 
whether there is a license requirement for auditors, and whether auditors have independence in 
reporting to supervisory bodies.  The variable is a principal component of the following five 
indicator variables.  (i) A dummy variable that takes 1 if external audit of banks is compulsory in 
the country. (Such audit is compulsory in all countries with the exception of Italy); (ii) an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if there are specific regulatory requirements for the 
extent of audit; (To the extent that audits are costly, in the absence of minimum requirements, 
audit services could be undersupplied.  Hence, the presence of such regulation improves audit 
services.)  (iii) a variable that takes 1 if auditors are required to be licensed or certified; (iv) an 
indicator variable that takes 1 if auditors’ report should be given to supervisory agency; and, 
finally, (v) a variable that takes 1 if supervisors can meet external auditors to discuss audit report 
without bank approval.    10
Quality third-party audit provides validation that bank-produced statements represent the 
financial condition of the bank as is, thereby increasing the credibility of the bank disclosure.  To 
the extent that this enhances the ability of market participants to accurately assess the risk profile 
of the bank, and strengthen market discipline, increase in theses variables would be associated 
with lower rates of fragility. 
In addition to these specific audit quality-related variables, I also consider the legal 
sanctions against auditors in the case of nonconformance.  Auditor Liability measures the degree 
of legal sanctions against auditors in the case of nonconformance.  I construct a variable by 
aggregating three variables that reflect legal burdens against auditors: (i) an indicator variable 
that takes 1 if auditors are legally required to report misconduct by managers/directors to 
supervisory agency, (ii) a variable that assumes the value 1 if legal action against external 
auditors be taken by supervisor for negligence, and (iii) a variable on legal enforcement which 
takes 1 if legal action has been taken against auditor in recent years. 
Table 1 and 2 provide summary of the variables. The stringency of external audit varies 
extensively across countries. Table 1 shows that the External Audit Stringency variable exhibits 
wide variation ranging in value from –6.725 to 0.554. Countries high on audit stringency tend to 
have lower incidence of banking crisis (Table 2). Audit stringency and crisis exhibit significant 
negative correlation.  Other indicators of audit professionalism, independence and audit rigor are 
all inversely correlated with incidence of crisis (not reported).   
Control Variables: To examine the relations between disclosure, audit stringency and 
banking crises, I control for a number of factors.  To control for macroeconomic (in) stability 
that are likely to affect the quality of bank assets thereby crisis probability, I use the average rate 
of inflation and the external terms of trade. This is consistent with previous research (e.g. 
Barth et al. (2004), Cull et al. (2003)). Inflation serves as a proxy for macroeconomic 
mismanagement that adversely affects the economy and the banking system. A chronically 
inflationary environment deteriorates the quality of bank assets and I expect inflation to increase 
bank crisis probability.  External terms of trade capture the macro economic shocks that could 
adversely affect banks by increasing their non-performing loans.  Improvements in terms of trade 
are expected to be associated with decreases in the likelihood of bank crises. Per capita GDP is 
included to control for the level of development of the country, and generally proxies for the 
quality of overall institutional environment. Banking sector problems could result from   11
weaknesses in the legal system which permeates widespread fraud, and/or weaknesses in the 
administrative capacity which is reflected in loose prudential supervision and regulation of the 
banking system. Per capita GDP is expected to measure differences across countries on these 
dimensions. 
Recent research identifies banking industry structure as a potential determinant of bank 
crises.  Beck et al. (2003) report that banking crisis is lower in countries with concentrated 
banking system and both Beck et al. (2003) and Barth et al. (2004) find that countries with 
banking industry structure that allows more competition and less regulatory restrictions have 
lower incidence of bank crises.  I use bank concentration, the share of assets of the three largest 
banks, to control for banking system concentration. I expect concentrated banking to be 
associated with less likelihood of crisis – a negative coefficient.  To control for the degree of 
competition in the banking sector, I use a variable, bank competition, which is a measure of 
banking competitive conduct obtained from Claessens and Laeven (2004).  Using a methodology 
from Panzar and Rosse (1987), they develop an index of competitiveness based on bank-level 
data in a large cross-section of banking systems, as a sum of the elasticity of bank revenue to 
changes in input prices.  The variable, bank competition, takes values between 1 (perfect 
competition) and 0 (with less than 1 representing monopolistic competition). Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) find that banking systems with less entry restrictions, less restriction to foreign 
bank entry and activity restrictions are more competitive, but find no inverse relation between 
competitiveness and concentration.  Barth et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2003) report inverse 
relation between restrictive regulations against entry and activity, and bank crisis.  I expect 
greater  bank competition in the banking system to be associated with lower likelihood of 
banking crisis.   
Table 1 summarizes the variables. The data displays enormous variations in the 
macroeconomic conditions and banking industry structure.  Average inflation (log) ranges from 
0.01 to 0.46 and, consistent with priors, is positively correlated with incidence of crisis. Bank 
concentration varies from a low of 19 percent to a high of 100 percent and, consistent with 
expectations, is associated with bank system stability, as is bank competition which has a 
significant negative correlation with incidence of crisis (Table 2).  As would be expected, Per 
capita GDP is negatively correlated with incidence of banking crisis. 
C. Sample  Selection   12
  I attempt to explain the likelihood of suffering banking crisis given information on the 
regulatory environment governing disclosure and auditing in different countries.  The data on 
regulation of disclosure and auditing, from the World Bank, is based on surveys of bank 
supervisory bodies in the late 90s.  Barth et al. (2004) reports that the regulatory and supervisory 
environment does not change significantly over time.  Yet, it is reasonable to assume that the 
survey results reflect the period closest to when the survey was taken more accurately than the 
distant past. Hence, due to these data limitations, and to minimize the problem of reverse 
causality, I focus on explaining incidence of banking crisis in the 90s (1990 through 1997).  For 
this period, I cover all countries with data on bank regulation and supervision and data on crises 
as my sample.  This results in a sample size of 49 countries with 22 episodes of crises (not 
counting the length of time of each crisis) involving 23 countries. Appendix I presents the list of 
countries in the sample and the episodes of crisis in the 1990s. 
III. Results 
 
  A.  Disclosure Requirements and Banking Crises 
  
Table 3 presents the results on the empirical relation between greater disclosure 
requirements and banking system stability. The table indicates that greater disclosure 
requirements reduce the likelihood of suffering a systemic banking crisis.  The disclosure 
variable enters the empirical models with a large statistically significant negative sign.  The 
inverse relation between greater disclosure and banking fragility holds controlling for 
macroeconomic sources of instability as well as banking industry structure.  In column (1) 
disclosure is associated with lower likelihood of systemic banking crisis controlling for macro-
economic sources of bank instability.  Column (2) indicates that disclosure lowers the likelihood 
of banking crisis controlling for banking industry structure.  The results hold in column (3) 
where I account for both sets of controls. Crisis probability is lower as well after controlling for 
the level of countries development as a proxy for overall institutional quality (column (4)). 
The results support the thesis that greater disclosure enhances bank system stability via 
strengthening market discipline. The impact of greater disclosure to bank stability is 
economically large.  For example, based on the complete model estimates in column (4),   13
increasing disclosure by one standard deviation would lower the likelihood of banking crisis by 
about 3.5 percent
4. This is a significant reduction, given that crisis probabilities are very low at 
any point in time (the mean value is about 6%).  Hoggarth and Saport (2001) report the 
cumulative output loss of the average banking crisis to be about 16 percent of GDP.  Applying 
the crisis-ameliorating probabilities, the impact of greater disclosure would be a saving of 
roughly about ½ percent of GDP. 
With respect to the control variables, confirming economic theory and previous empirical 
results, improvements in external terms of trade reduces crisis probability while unbridled 
inflation increases crisis probability. More developed economies are less likely to suffer systemic 
banking crisis indicating the positive role of the overall quality of the institutional environment.  
As predicted, bank concentration lowers banking crisis probability confirming the results in Beck 
et al. (2003).  Also, as expected, banking crisis is less likely in more competitive banking 
systems. While this is broadly consistent with earlier findings (Barth et al. (2004)) and Beck et 
al. (2003)) that regulatory restrictions as to entry and bank activity fosters bank fragility, the 
direct evidence that increased competitive conduct (or competitiveness) lowers the likelihood of 
banking crisis is a new finding in this paper.  The seemingly contradictory findings that both 
concentrated and competitive markets foster stability could be interpreted as that it is the 
contestability of markets that matter.  Alternatively, large banks through their diversification 
ability strengthen banking system stability while increased competition curbs the banks’ 
potential extractive tendencies. Overall, the model fits the data well, correctly predicting crises 
episodes more than 93 % of the time. 
Panel B of Table 3 explores the disclosure-stability link by focusing on the role of 
specific disclosure properties.  Panel B indicates that for bank disclosure to have impact on 
banking system stability, disclosure has to be accurate (or informative), timely and 
comprehensive.  Improvements in bank disclosure informativeness reduce banking system crisis 
probability (column 5), as does enhancing the timeliness of bank reports (column (6)).    
Supplementary information, in addition to the standard financial statements, appears to 
significantly impact the effectiveness of bank disclosure to stability.  Such information, in the 
                                                 
4 Noting that the predicted value from the model provides an estimate for Ln(pit/(1+pit), increasing Disclosure by one 
standard deviation (i.e. 0.945), holding the other variables at their mean levels, increases Ln(pit/(1+pit) by -3.325 (i.e. 
-3.519X 0.945).  Solving for pit, probability that banking crisis would occur in country i during period t, pit = e
-
3.325/(1+e
-3.325), which is equal to 0.0347.   14
form of a detailed discussion of bank risk management practices and off-balance sheet 
transactions allow informed assessment of bank risk profile by market participants, fostering 
market disciple to work. Column (7) indicates the impact of this type of information in 
enhancing banking stability. 
In general, specific requirements meant to increase greater accuracy and 
comprehensiveness of disclosure are associated with higher probability of bank stability.  In 
particular, regulatory requirements that call for consolidated financial statements for banks 
(Column 9), and requirements for disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions (Column 10) to the 
public lower the likelihood of bank crises. Requirements for accurate reporting of non-
performing loans (Column 8) enters with a negative sign (implying that it reduces bank fragility), 
but are significant only at 20% level.  Similarly, disclosure of risk management methods 
(Column 11), while enters with the right sign, is not significant at the conventional levels. 
Regulations that sanction legal liability on directors for misinformation have no statistically 
significant impact on fragility (column 12).  This may reflect the fact that those sanctions could 
be covered in the countries’ security laws, and hence could be redundant when packaged as bank 
regulation.  To see if the impacts of disclosure requirements on banking stability are simply 
reflections of the legal sanctions against managers for misinformation, in column (13), I include 
both the disclosure and the directors’ liability variables.  Greater disclosure fosters banking 
system stability after accounting for legal liability.  
Overall, the results are consistent with the disclosure-stability view that greater disclosure 
fosters bank stability via market discipline.  The results are also supportive of the goal of the 
third pillar of the New Basal Capital Accord that aims to encourage market discipline by 
developing a set of disclosure requirements that allow market participants to assess bank risk 
positions and capital adequacy.  The benefits of the specific recommendations in areas of 
supplemental reporting, consolidation, and reporting risk methodologies for fostering bank 
stability are validated by the findings. 
B.  Regulation of Audit Practices and Banking Crises 
 
Table 4 indicates that regulations that call for stringent external audit of bank-generated 
information lowers the likelihood of banking crises.  External Audit Stringency enters the   15
regressions with a large statistically significant negative coefficient in all specifications. In 
column (1), greater audit stringency is associated with lower likelihood of systemic banking 
crisis, controlling for macro-economic sources of bank instability.  Column (2) indicates that 
banking systems with stringent external audit requirements are less vulnerable to crisis, 
controlling for banking industry structure.  The inverse relation between audit stringency and 
bank fragility holds in column (3) where I account for both sets of controls.  The same holds, 
when, in addition, I control for countries’ level of development.  
Evaluating the marginal effects of audit stringency, we see that a one standard deviation 
increase in the audit variable based on the full model in column (4) results in a decrease in crisis 
probability by about 25 percent, a much larger effect than the impact of disclosure.  However, 
one should note that a comparison of the two could be misleading as the audit stringency variable 
has a much wider distribution than the disclosure variable. Nonetheless, the computation 
provides a sense of how large the economic impact of strengthening audit requirements is. 
To evaluate if this effect of audit stringency on bank crisis is simply a proxy for the 
impact of greater disclosure, column (5) explicitly controls for bank disclosure. More stringent 
external audit requirements foster bank stability, controlling for greater disclosure.  The result 
indicates that stringent auditing is not a substitute for accurate and comprehensive disclosure. 
Rather regulations that call for more vigilant external audit complement greater disclosure in 
fostering banking system stability. 
The results also indicate that the control variables act as predicted. The overall effects of 
bank concentration and bank competition on crisis likelihood are still negative and significant. 
Terms of trade improvements reduce and higher inflation increases crisis probability.  In 
addition, the models fit the data well, correctly identifying episodes of crises up to 95% of the 
time. 
Panel B of Table 4 examines the link between auditing stringency and bank system 
stability further by focusing on specific external auditing-related regulatory requirements.  In 
general, specific requirements meant to increase external audit stringency are associated with 
lower likelihood of banking crises.  Measures meant to represent strengthening of auditor 
independence appear to be most important (columns (7) and (8).  These are the requirements for 
external audit reports to be submitted to supervisory authorities, and the requirement that bank 
supervisory authorities can meet external auditors to discuss audit reports without bank approval.     16
Regulations that set standards about the amount and extent of audit (column (6)) is not 
statistically related to bank stability (though the variable carries the right sign).  I do not report 
on the impacts of having compulsory auditing and the requirements for auditors to be licensed 
because, in my sample, almost all countries require audited financial statements (except in Italy) 
and licensed or certified auditors. The variables do not exhibit cross-country variation.  
Regulations that sanction additional legal liability against auditors and enforcement of 
those sanctions do not appear to materially affect bank stability.  It might be that those sanctions 
are covered in the countries’ security laws and could be redundant in banking regulations. To see 
if the impact of external audit stringency to banking stability is merely a reflection of the legal 
sanctions against auditors, column (10) includes both auditor liability and audit stringency.   
External audit stringency robustly reduces crisis probability controlling for auditor liability. 
The findings support the disclosure-stability view in that stringent external audit 
complements greater disclosure in fostering bank stability. The results are consistent with the 
notion that external audit add value to market discipline by providing third-party verification of 
information that banks are reluctant to release to the public voluntarily.  In their loan decisions, 
banks collect private information from their customers.  Banks are reluctant to disclose 
proprietary information about their customers, making it difficult for outsiders, without access to 
individual loan information, to assess the health of the bank. External auditors have access to 
bank’s individual loans and the banks’ risk management practices.  By validating through their 
audit report, external auditors enrich the information environment, allowing investors to assess 
bank health, and market discipline to work in fostering bank stability.   
In this respect, the New Basal Capital Accord, while requiring extensive disclosure, does 
not recommend external audit beyond required for financial reporting purposes.  The evidence 
suggests that there may be value in extending audit requirements to cover the newly required 
disclosure.  
IV. Robustness  Checks 
 
  To ensure accurate inference and avoid mechanical explanations for the main results so 
far, I provide a series of sensitivity checks in this section.  First, the main results of the paper, the 
inverse relation between disclosure and banking system fragility and between external audit   17
stringency and fragility is robust to measuring the focal variables – Bank Disclosure and 
External Audit Stringency - differently.  In column (1), (2) and (3) of Table 5, I measure Bank 
Disclosure and External Audit Stringency as sums of the component indicator variables rather 
than as principal components.  The effect of greater disclosure and audit stringency on crisis 
likelihood is negative and very significant.  In addition, I use measures of restrictions to entry 
into the banking sector and regulatory restrictions on bank activity as alternative measure of the 
competitiveness of the banking sector, instead of the variable, bank competition (results not 
reported). The main results remain robust. 
Second, defining crisis episodes differently does not change the main findings.  In 
column (4), the crisis event is defined in such a way that if a country experiences a banking crisis 
in any year in the 90s, it is considered as a crisis country for the entire sample period.  The effect 
of greater disclosure and audit stringency remains negative and highly significant.  In column 
(5), when the crisis period lasts more than a year, I define as the crisis year (event) only the first 
year of the crisis period and exclude the subsequent crisis years from the analysis.  The impact of 
disclosure and external audit stringency is unaffected by such a change.   
Column (6) checks whether the main finding is sensitive to whether a banking system has 
experienced recent crisis.  I include an indicator variable that takes 1 if the country has gone 
through a banking crisis in the 80s. The results hold controlling for recent crisis history.   
Column (7) controls for the features of countries’ deposit insurance systems.  Demirguc-
Kunt et al. (2002) report that explicit deposit insurance increases (weakly) banking instability via 
exasperating the risk-shifting incentives of banks. To account for this possibility, I include an 
indicator variable for explicit deposit insurance countries, similar to the way Demirguc-Kunt et 
al. (2002) did. Greater disclosure and audit stringency reduces crisis probability, controlling for 
the design feature of the banking safety net.  
In column (8), I estimate the model using a random-effects panel specification so as to (i) 
account for intra-country and intra-year correlations in the error terms and (ii) properly control 
for all other non-observable country-related and non-observable year-related sources of crisis 
probability.  The model accounts for any omitted country related and industry related factor.  
Disclosure and audit stringency have robust negative impacts on bank fragility.  
Finally, the results from the multivariate logistic regression so far do not explicitly 
control for the potential for endogeneity.  It might be argued that banking fragility could lead to   18
lower disclosure due to fears of greater instability from disclosing bank problems.  Alternatively, 
because the survey data on disclosure regulation is collected following the crises periods, it could 
be argued that a country’s experience of crisis might be dictating its choice of disclosure regime.  
For example, a country that experienced recent crises could adopt a policy of increased 
disclosure and transparency (i.e., a positive relation between crisis and disclosure).   I examine 
these possibilities of reverse causality using instrumental variables to identify the exogenous 
component of disclosure and audit stringency.   
Based on theory and recent empirical works, I use the legal origin of countries as 
instruments.  La Porta et al. (1998) show that civil law countries tend to support government 
intervention relative to private property rights.  To the extent that disclosure and audit 
requirements are government sanctions, their prevalence could be partially dictated by the legal 
tradition of the country whereas the latter has little effect on the probability of crisis.  Legal 
origin has also been extensively used as an instrument in the finance-growth literature (see 
Levine (2003)) as well as in the banking crises literature (see, e.g., Barth et al. (2004)). I estimate 
an instrumental variables model with legal origin as instruments.  In the first stage regressions, 
the data does not reject the validity of the instruments. Columns (9) and (10) present the 
instrumental variables results.  They confirm the major findings in Table 3 and Table 4 that (i) 
greater disclosure requirements lower the likelihood of systemic banking crisis; and (ii) more 
stringent external audit increases the likelihood of banking system stability. Hence controlling 
for simultaneity via the instruments does not alter the major findings of the inverse relation 
between disclosure and bank fragility and audit stringency and bank fragility. The results 
therefore are less likely to be explained by reverse causality. 
V.  Conclusion 
 
While the history of banking crises stretches as far back as there has been banking 
systems, recent banking crises have been more frequent and costly.  The recurring financial 
crises of the late 1990s coupled with recent corporate scandals around the world have brought to 
the fore the public debate on the need for strengthening market discipline through greater 
disclosure and transparency.    19
The role of disclosure and transparency to banking system stability is not well 
understood, however.  While the ‘disclosure-stability’ view holds that greater disclosure fosters 
stability through reducing informational asymmetries, the ‘disclosure-fragility’ view emphasizes 
the negative externalities that may be associated with greater disclosure and its potential to 
stymie stability.  Reflecting the theoretical debate, disclosure policies have not made significant 
inroads in bank regualtions around the world despite calls for more transparency by concerned 
international policy makers. 
The paper examines the role of greater disclosure in fostering banking system stability.  
Based on data on a cross-section of forty-nine countries in the 1990s, the paper studies the 
impact of increased bank disclosure requirements and stronger auditing regulatory regimes on 
the likelihood of suffering systemic banking crisis.  
The study documents that greater disclosure and stringent external audit requirements are 
strongly associated with banking system stability. Specifically, the likelihood of systemic 
banking crisis is lower in countries with regulations that require (i) more comprehensive 
disclosure, (ii) more informative disclosure, (iii) more timely disclosure; and (iv) more stringent 
external auditing of bank reporting.  The impact of greater banking disclosure to banking 
stability appears also to be economically large.  The results indicate that greater disclosure 
results in significant savings in countries’ real output loss that is often associated with banking 
system instability. 
In policy terms, the findings provide empirical regularities consistent with the goals of 
the third pillar of the New Basal Capital Accord that aims to encourage market discipline by 
developing a set of disclosure requirements that allow market participants to assess bank risk 
positions and capital adequacy. The New Accord’s initiatives in requiring greater disclosure are 
consistent with the broader regulatory objectives of promoting banking system stability. The 
benefits of the specific recommendations of the initiative in the areas of supplemental reporting, 
consolidation, reporting risk methodologies, and frequency of reporting in fostering banking 
system stability are validated in the findings.  To further enhance the benefits of greater 
disclosure, the results emphasize the importance also of improving the credibility of reporting.  
While expanding the scope of bank disclosure, the New Accord does not provide verification 
requirements beyond those required for accounting reporting, and security registration.  The   20
results underscore the value of external audit stringency in improving transparency and 
promoting bank stability.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable  N Mean  Std  Dev  Minimum  Maximum
Crisis  392 0.060  0.397  0  1.000 
Bank Disclosure  378 0.274  0.869 -1.800  1.935 
Disclosure Informativeness  394 0.009  1.002 -3.505  0.565 
Disclosure Timeliness  304 65.28  25.54 17.39  99.28 
Supplemental Reporting  409 0.272  0.841 -1.295  1.392 
Presentation of Non-Performing 
Loans 
402 0.858  0.350  0  1.000 
Reporting Consolidated Statements  417 0.879  0.326  0  1.000 
Reporting Off-Balance Sheet 
To Public 
417 0.860  0.348  0  1.000 
Reporting Risk Management Practice  417 0.329  0.471  0  1.000 
Director Liability  377 0.011  1.105 -2.941  1.044 
External Audit Stringency  313 0.024  1.124 -6.725  0.554 
Compulsory Audit  313 0.981  0.137  0  1.000 
Required Extent of Audit  313 0.709  0.455  0  1.000 
License Requirement  313 0.981  0.137  0  1.000 
Auditor Report to Supervisor  313 0.962  0.192  0  1.000 
Auditor Meet Supervisor without 
consent of Bank 
313 0.709  0.455  0  1.000 
Auditor Liability  417 0.013  0.924 -1.408  1.100 
Bank Competition  198 0.649  0.104 0.410  0.860 
Bank Concentration  420 0.715  0.219 0.190  1.000 
External Terms of Trade  383 0.024  0.092 -0.189  0.232 
Log of average Inflation  423 0.115  0.102 0.010  0.460 
Per capita GDP  319 8.428  1.661 5.000  10.701 
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Table 2: Correlations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 system  Bank 
Disclosure 
Disclosure 
Informativeness 
Disclosure 
Timeliness 
Supplemental 
Reporting 
External 
Audit 
Stringency 
Bank 
Concentration 
Bank 
Competition 
External 
Terms of 
Trade  
Inflation  
Bank Disclosure  -0.00731 
(0.8885) 
              
Disclosure 
Informativeness 
-0.0286 
(0.888) 
0.1229 
(0.018) 
             
Disclosure 
Timeliness 
-0.0054 
(0.575) 
0.2719 
(0.0001) 
0.3704 
(0.0001) 
          
Supplemental 
Reporting 
-0.0289 
(0.564) 
0.9225 
(0.0001) 
0.2129 
(0.0001) 
0.2946 
(0.0001) 
         
External Audit 
Stringency 
-0.26675 
(<0.0001) 
-0.19825 
(0.0001) 
0.1387 
(0.0058) 
-0.1837 
(0.002) 
-0.1507 
(0.0022) 
        
Bank 
Concentration 
0.05374 
(0.2041) 
0.05404 
(0.2999) 
0.3231 
(0.0001) 
-0.0844 
(0.1416) 
0.0649 
(0.1901) 
0.29267 
(<.0001) 
      
Bank 
Competition 
-0.26343 
(<.0001) 
0.00250 
(0.9709) 
0.1854 
(0.005) 
0.0866 
(0.1966) 
0.1972 
(0.0025) 
0.15144 
(0.0234) 
0.41617 
(<.0001) 
    
External Terms 
of Trade 
0.02583 
(0.6144) 
-0.30211 
(<.0001) 
-0.2734 
(0.0001) 
-0.1448 
(0.0153) 
-0.2675 
(0.0001) 
0.03622 
(0.5293) 
-0.06772 
(0.1860) 
-0.01916 
(0.7755) 
  
Inflation 0.01597 
(0.7432) 
-0.37016 
(<.0001) 
-0.0925 
(0.1118) 
-0.5021 
(0.0001) 
-0.4202 
(0.0001) 
0.20828 
(0.0002) 
0.09893 
(0.0420) 
0.29594 
(<.0001) 
-0.01223 
(0.8153) 
 
Per Capita GDP  -0.13094 
(0.0069) 
0.42028 
(<.0001) 
0.1527 
(0.0024) 
0.48889 
(0.0001) 
0.3366 
(0.0001) 
-0.12436 
(0.0110) 
-0.25521 
(<.0001) 
-0.05737 
(0.3844) 
-0.30561 
(<.0001) 
-0.52670 
(<.0001)   24
Table 3: Bank Disclosure and Banking Crises 
 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The dependent variables is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value one fi there is a 
systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Bank Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the 
three largest banks in each country averaged over the sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, calculated as the 
sum of elasticities bank revenue to changes in input prices from Cleassens and Laeven (2004). External Terms of Trade is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price 
index for a country.  Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate.  Bank Disclosure is a measure of the extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.    Disclosure 
Informativeness is a measure of the degree to which bank disclosure accurately represents banks’ financial condition.   Disclosure Timeliness is a measure of the bank disclosure is made on timely basis, 
calculated as the value is an index of the average frequency and comprehensiveness of interim financial reports.  Supplemental Reporting is a measure of the extent of supplementary information as 
required by countries’ banking regulation.  Director Liability is a measure of the degree of legal sanctions against bank officials for nonperformance vis-à-vis the bank regulations. Presentation of Non-
Performing Loans, Reporting Consolidated Financial Statements, Reporting Off-balance Sheet to Public, and Reporting Risk Management Practices are dummy variables that take the value one if the 
countries’ bank regulation requires the specific provision and the value zero otherwise.  Per capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. The sample 
period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
 
Panel A  Panel B   
1 2 3  4  5 6 7 8 9  10  11 12    13   
Bank 
Concentration 
 -3.463
b 
(1.394) 
0.013 
-6.864
 b 
(2.762) 
0.013 
-7.483
 b 
(3.1748) 
0.0184 
-13.276
 a 
(4.372) 
0.002 
-1.927 
(1.592) 
0.226 
-7.934
 b 
(3.684) 
0.031 
-16.769
 b 
(6.6486) 
0.0117 
-9.430
 b 
(3.9420) 
0.0167 
-7.354 
(3.7751) 
0.0514 
-10.326
 b 
(4.0849) 
0.0115 
-13.258
 a 
(4.930) 
0.0072 
-8.002
 b 
(3.497) 
0.0221 
Bank Competition  
 -3.377 
(1.912) 
0.773 
-16.850
 b 
(6.668) 
0.0115 
-16.075
 a 
(5.7350) 
0.0051 
-9.633
 a 
(3.195) 
0.002 
-11.455
 a 
(3.443) 
0.0009 
-16.025
 b 
(6.748) 
0.018 
-8.979
 a 
(3.1899) 
0.0049 
-9.436
 a 
(3.2311) 
0.0035 
-20.350
 b 
(7.9479) 
0.0105 
-7.418
 b 
(3.0532) 
0.0151 
-8.486
 a 
(3.146) 
0.0070 
-17.458
 a 
(6.112) 
0.0043 
External Terms of 
Trade 
-8.8716
 a 
(2.175) 
<.0001 
 -22.109
 a 
(5.738) 
0.0001 
-18.501
a 
(5.2192) 
0.0004 
-13.972
 a 
(4.097) 
0.0007 
-5.130 
(4.292) 
0.232 
-15.757
 a 
(4.996) 
0.002 
-11.427
 a 
(3.6296) 
0.0016 
-13.312
 a 
(4.0093) 
0.0009 
-17.152
 a 
(5.6095) 
0.0016 
-9.755
 a 
(3.3507) 
0.0036 
-11.490
 a 
(3.911) 
0.0033 
-22.029
 a 
(6.143) 
0.0003 
Inflation 
-0.9026 
(1.794) 
0.615 
 11.565
 a 
(3.997) 
0.004 
10.028
 a 
(3.8654) 
0.0095 
14.255
 a 
(4.436) 
0.001 
5.511
 b 
(2.531) 
0.0295 
7.720 
(3.877) 
0.047 
15.070
 a 
(5.6825) 
0.0080 
11.488
 a 
(3.4984) 
0.0010 
9.6487
 b 
(4.0308) 
0.0167 
8.895
 b  
(3.6492) 
0.0148 
13.14729
a 
(4.4667) 
0.0051 
12.711
a 
(4.719) 
0.0071 
Bank Disclosure 
 
-0.4776
 b 
(0.225) 
0.0337 
-0.591
 b 
(0.261) 
0.0234 
-3.889
 a 
(1.056) 
0.0002 
-3.5191
 a 
(0.9987) 
0.0004 
          -3.981
 a 
(1.128) 
0.0004 
Disclosure 
Informativeness 
     -0.8255
 b 
(0.4242) 
0.0517 
          
Disclosure 
Timeliness  
       -0.0248
 c 
(0.0144) 
0.0891 
         
Supplemental 
Reporting  
        -3.113
 a 
(0.967) 
0.001 
        
Presentation of Non-
Performing Loans 
         -2.4420 
(1.7923) 
0.1730 
       
Reporting 
Consolidated 
Statements 
          -1.934
c 
(1.1137) 
0.0825 
      
Reporting Off-
Balance Sheet 
To Public 
           -4.7716
 a 
(1.4379) 
0.0009 
   
Reporting Risk 
Management Practice 
            -1.1666 
(1.1066) 
02919 
  
Director Liability  
             -0.4617 
(0.4667) 
03225 
-0.7073 
(0.584) 
0.2260 
Per Capita  
GDP 
   -0.3790 
(0.2424) 
0.1180 
0.0446 
(0.206) 
(0.828) 
-0.4910 
(0.253) 
0.0520 
-0.834
 a 
(0.245) 
0.0007 
-0.9381
 a 
(0.3409) 
0.0059 
-0.2727 
(0.3366) 
0.4179 
-0.8290
 a 
(0.2454) 
0.0007 
-0.7011
 a 
(0.2404) 
0.0035 
-0.7376
 a 
(0.2584) 
0.0043 
-0.2949 
(0.270) 
0.2749 
Model χ
2 
19.985
 a 
0.0002 
24.737
 a 
<.0001 
81.897
 a 
(<.0001) 
84.577
 a 
(<.0001) 
68.846
 a 
<.0001 
34.379
 a 
<.0001 
85.366
 a 
<.0001 
66.618
 a 
(<.0001) 
70.8748
 a 
(<.0001) 
83.664
 a 
(<.0001) 
71.493
 a 
(<.0001) 
67.789
 a 
(<.0001) 
88.923
a 
(<.0001) 
% success 
68.2 71.2 92.0 93.3  91.4 80.9 94.0 90.5 91.7 93.5 91.5  91.1  93.1 
Pseudo R
2 
0.086  0.119  0.5199 0.5369  0.437  0.23  0.532  0.4229 0.4420 0.4782 0.4459  0.418  0.462 
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent 
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Table 4: External Audit Stringency and Banking Crises 
 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The dependent variables is an indicator variable, crisis, that takes on the value 
one fi there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Bank Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking industry, calculated as the 
fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country averaged over the sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of degree of competitive 
conduct in the banking industry, calculated as the sum of elasticities bank revenue to changes in input prices from Cleassens and Laeven (2004). External Terms 
of Trade is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country.  Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate. External Audit Stringency is a 
measure of the degree to which external audits are independent, professional and rigorous as reflected in bank regulations governing audit practices.  Bank Disclosure is a measure of the 
extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.     Auditor Liability is a measure of the degree of legal sanctions against auditors in the case of nonperformance 
vis-à-vis the bank regulations.  Required Extent of Audit, Auditor Report to Supervisor, and Auditor Meet Supervisor without Consent of Bank are dummy variables that take the value 
one if the countries’ bank regulation requires the specific provision and the value zero otherwise.  Per capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are 
standard errors.  The sample period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
Panel A  Panel B   
1  2  3  4  5 6 7  8 9  10 
Bank Concentration   -1.006 
(1.491) 
0.499 
-5.357
b 
(2.637) 
0.0422 
-19.342
 b 
(7.8088) 
0.0133 
-6.7264 
(4.4331) 
0.1292 
-23.8571 
(17.0279) 
0.1612 
-16.774
b 
(7.0253) 
0.0170 
-16.524
b 
(6.6529) 
0.0130 
-12.027
 b 
(4.667) 
0.0100 
-19.012
 b 
(7.385) 
0.0100 
Bank Competition    -4.512
 b 
(2.141) 
0.0351 
-8.380
 b 
(3.524) 
0.0174 
-10.806
 a 
(3.9334) 
0.0060 
-18.417
 a 
(6.6996) 
0.0060 
-14.573
 c 
(8.3552) 
0.0811 
-10.589
 a 
(3.8956) 
0.0066 
-8.152
 b 
(3.4979) 
0.0198 
-8.343
 b 
(3.345) 
0.0126 
-10.280
 a 
(4.214) 
0.0.015 
External Terms of 
Trade 
-7.422
a 
(2.155) 
0.0006 
 -10.252
 a 
(3.378) 
0.0024 
-6.652
 c 
(3.5002) 
0.0574 
-14.9872
 a 
(5.0292) 
0.0029 
-0.00876 
(9.7175) 
0.9993 
-7.766
 b 
(3.2688) 
0.0175 
-10.038
 a 
(3.6057) 
0.0054 
-9.775
 a 
(3.450) 
0.0046 
-6.433
 c 
(3.517) 
0.0673 
Log of Average 
Inflation 
2.713 
(1.645) 
0.099 
 9.603
 a 
(2.405) 
<.0001 
20.377
 a 
(7.6006) 
0.0073 
12.0865
 a 
(4.6049) 
0.0087 
26.8497 
(20.1855) 
0.1835 
17.212
 b 
(6.8609) 
0.0121 
16.427
 a 
(5.8772) 
0.0052 
11.0189
a 
(4.1294) 
0.0076 
19.213
b 
(8.078) 
0.0174 
External Audit 
Stringency 
-0.704
 a 
(0.215) 
0.0011 
-0.4623
 a 
(0.1327) 
.0005 
-0.3732 
(0.282) 
0.185 
-0.985
 a 
(0.3715) 
0.008 
-0.7785
 b 
(0.3373) 
0.0210 
      -0.9783
 a 
(0.366) 
(0.0075) 
Bank Disclosure 
 
      -3.6350
 a 
(1.1072) 
0.0010 
      
Required Extent of 
Audit 
        -2.9237 
(2.8774) 
0.3096 
     
Auditor Report to 
Supervisor 
         -3.5564
 a 
(1.3024) 
0.0063 
   
Auditor Meet 
Supervisor without 
consent of Bank 
            -1.361
 b 
(0.7042) 
0.0533 
  
Auditor Liability                 0.0422 
(0.5895) 
0.9421 
0.1990 
(0.707) 
0.778 
Per Capita 
GDP 
    -1.449
 a 
(0.538) 
0.0071 
-0.7507
 a 
(0.3761) 
0.0460 
-1.6103 
(1.1767) 
0.1712 
-1.4607
 a 
(0.5273) 
0.0056 
-0.8725
 a 
(0.3364) 
0.0095 
-0.7458
 a 
(0.2741) 
0.0076 
-1.435
 a 
(0.513) 
0.0051 
Model χ
2  25.768
 a 
<.0001 
38.017
 a 
<.0001 
58.149
 a 
<.0001 
76.378
 a 
(<.0001) 
90.8366
 a 
(<.0001) 
69.918
 a 
(<.0001) 
76.989
 a 
(<.0001) 
71.783
 a 
(<.0001) 
67.578
 a 
(<.0001) 
81.699
a 
(<.0001) 
% success  69.6  75.5  89.4  91.2  94.8 91.9 92.1  92.2 91.0 92.2 
Pseudo R
2  0.106 0.181 0.363  0.476  0.5277  0.4361  0.4802  0.4477  0.421  0.400 
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent 
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Table 5:  Robustness Tests 
 
The estimated coefficients are parameter estimates of multivariate logistic models. The estimates under column (8) are maximum likelihood estimates of a random 
effects model with random country and year effects. The coefficient estimates of the country and year effects are not reported.  The estimates in column (9) and (10) 
are estimates of  two stage instrumental variables models, where countries’ legal origins are used as instruments. The dependent variables is an indicator variable, 
crisis, that takes on the value one fi there is a systemic banking crisis and the value zero otherwise. Bank Concentration is a measure of concentration in the banking 
industry, calculated as the fraction of assets held by the three largest banks in each country averaged over the sample period. Bank Competition is a measure of 
degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, calculated as the sum of elasticities bank revenue to changes in input prices from Cleassens and Laeven 
(2004). External Terms of Trade is the logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country.  Inflation is the logarithm of average inflation rate. External 
Audit Stringency is a measure of the degree to which external audits are independent, professional and rigorous as reflected in bank regulations governing audit practices.  Bank Disclosure 
is a measure of the extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.  Crisis in 80s Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the country has 
undergone a systemic banking crisis in the 1980s and the value zero otherwise.  Explicit Deposit Insurance is an indicator variable that takes the value one if the country has an explicit 
deposit fixed-premium deposit insurance scheme and the value zero otherwise.  Per capita GDP is the logarithm of real per capita GDP.  Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. The 
sample period is 1990 through 1997. Detailed variable definitions are given in Appendix II. 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
IV 
10 
IV 
Bank Concentration  -20.464
a 
(6.2325) 
0.0010 
-21.484
b 
(8.8770) 
0.0155 
-22.3606
a 
(6.9441) 
0.0013 
4.1210
c 
(2.3965) 
0.0855 
0.3510 
(7.1482) 
0.9608 
6.4004
b 
(3.1137) 
0.0398 
-7.5412 
(4.698) 
0.1085 
-1.2498 
(1.8051) 
0.4898 
-2.1634 
(1.531) 
0.1577 
-2.1585 
(1.5314) 
0.1587 
Bank Competition  -29.5716
b 
(14.1675) 
0.0369 
-11.1511
a 
(4.0093) 
0.0054 
-24.6885
b 
(10.1235) 
0.0147 
-9.1419
a 
(3.5171) 
0.0093 
-11.9331 
(8.1550) 
0.1434 
-12.3598
a 
(4.0134) 
0.0021 
-16.115
b 
(7.140) 
0.0240 
-3.585 
(2.389) 
0.1339 
-16.459
a 
(4.525) 
0.0003 
-16.393
a 
(4.5609) 
0.0003 
External Terms of 
Trade 
-44.0846
b 
(18.5030) 
0.0172 
-5.6872 
(3.7396) 
0.1283 
-36.4107
a 
(13.8346) 
0.0085 
-3.5655 
(3.2484) 
0.2724 
-7.3000 
(6.3557) 
0.2507 
-7.4815
c 
(4.2367) 
0.0774 
-15.555
a 
(4.908) 
0.0015 
-6.8488
b 
(2.9776) 
0.0228 
-2.5983 
(3.025) 
0.3903 
-2.6190 
(3.0308) 
0.3875 
Inflation  31.8420
b 
(12.4148) 
0.0103 
22.9841
a 
(8.7937) 
0.0090 
31.8411
a 
(10.0900) 
0.0016 
-2.4940 
(2.7385) 
0.3624 
6.9267 
(6.6802) 
0.2998 
-4.2299 
(2.9737) 
0.1549 
9.0285
c 
(4.975) 
0.0696 
1.3434 
(2.8266) 
0.6353 
4.6521
c 
(2.433) 
0.0559 
4.6338
c 
(2.4374) 
0.0573 
Bank Disclosure 
- Alternative 
-7.6168
b 
(3.2857) 
0.0204 
 -6.8749
a 
(2.537) 
0.0067 
       
External Audit 
Stringency - 
Alternative 
 -1.0738
b 
(0.4556) 
0.0184 
-0.8414
b 
(0.4048) 
0.0377 
       
Bank Disclosure      -3.1645
a 
(0.5984) 
<.0001 
-2.5155
c 
(1.4507) 
0.0829 
-4.9436
a 
(1.5489) 
0.0014 
-3.1668
a 
(1.0838) 
0.0035 
-0.6259
c 
(0.3578) 
0.0823 
-3.6860
b 
(1.526) 
0.0157 
 
 
 
External Audit 
Stringency 
    -2.0935
a 
(0.4826) 
<.0001 
-1.5593
c 
(0.9440) 
0.0986 
-2.7507
a 
(0.7968) 
0.0006 
-0.6811
b 
(0.3496) 
0.0514 
-0.5218
 c 
(0.2996) 
0.0829 
 
 
 
-1.0180
b 
(0.4215) 
0.0157 
Crisis in 80s Dummy        -1.9282 
(1.3406) 
0.1503 
    
Explicit Deposit 
Insurance 
       1.5396 
(1.4605) 
0.2918 
   
Per capita GDP  -0.00646 
(0.4747) 
0.9891 
-1.4008
b 
(0.5488) 
0.0107 
-0.3434 
(0.4835) 
0.4775 
-1.5096
a 
(0.3010) 
<.0001 
-1.0991
c 
(0.5832) 
0.0595 
-2.1154
a 
(0.5896) 
0.0003 
-1.0685
b 
(0.5328) 
0.0449 
-0.2169 
(0.1837) 
0.2397 
-0.6021
a 
(0.207) 
0.0036 
-0.5998
a 
(0.2075) 
0.0038 
Model χ
2  95.0770
a 
(<.0001) 
74.5921
a 
(<.0001) 
100.2814
a 
(<.0001) 
74.4796
a 
(<.0001) 
11.5356
a 
(<.0732) 
126.7186
a 
(<.0001) 
92.094
a 
(<.0001)
 
584.9
a 
(<.0001) 
55.2715
a 
(<.0001) 
49.2495
a 
(<.0001) 
% success  94.7 92.4 96.0 93.3 95.8 93.3 95.2 NA 86.9 85.5 
Pseudo R 
2  0.5930 0.4652 0.6224 0.3383 0.2607 0.5755  0.585  NA  0.239  0.2845 
a significant at 1 percent; 
b significant at 5 percent; 
c significant at 10 percent 
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Appendix I: Systemic Banking Crises in the 1990s 
 
Country  Banking Crisis in 
1990s 
  
Country  Banking Crisis in 
1990s 
Australia   Japan  1992-97 
Austria   Jordan    1990 
Bahrain   Kenya  1993 
Belgium   Korea,  South  1997 
Botswana   Lesotho   
Burundi   Malaysia  1997 
Canada   Mauritania  1990-93 
Chile   Mexico 1994-97 
Denmark   Nepal   
El Salvador    Nigeria  1991-95 
Egypt   Pakistan     
Finland 1991-94  Peru  1990 
France   Philippines   
Germany   Portugal   
Ghana   Singapore   
Greece   Sri  Lanka 1990-93 
Guatemala   Sweden  1990-93 
Guyana 1993-95  Switzerland     
Honduras   Thailand  1997 
India 1991-97  Turkey  1991,  1994 
Indonesia 1992-97 United  Kingdom   
Ireland   U.S.A.  1990-92 
Israel   Venezuela  1993-97 
Italy 1990-95  Zambia  
Jamaica 1996-97     
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Appendix II: Definition of Main Variables 
 
Variables Definition 
Dependent Variables: 
      
     Crisis   
 
 
 
Indicator variable that takes 1 if a country has undergone systemic banking crisis in the period 1990 through 1997. 
Explanatory Variables: 
 
     Bank Disclosure 
     
 
 
    
 
 
    Disclosure Informativeness 
 
    Disclosure Timeliness 
 
 
    Supplemental Reporting 
 
      
    Director Liability 
 
    External Audit Stringency 
 
 
 
 
     
 
    Auditor Liability  
 
 
 
A measure of the extent and comprehensiveness of financial reporting required of banks.  Its values are the principal 
component of four indicator variables: (i)  Presentation of Non-Performing Loans - a variable that takes 1 if bank regulation 
requires that accrued income on non-performing loans should not be reported; (ii) Reporting Consolidated Financial 
Statements - a variable that takes 1 if consolidated financial statements of bank and non-bank subsidiaries are required; (iii) 
Reporting Off-Balance-Sheet  to the Public - a variable that takes 1 if off balance sheet items are required to be disclosed to 
the public; and (iv) Reporting Risk Management Practice -  a variable that takes 1 if banks are required to disclose risk 
management practices to the public. 
 
A measure of the degree to which bank disclosure accurately represents banks’ financial condition. Its values are the 
principal components of the indicator variables in (i) and (ii) above 
 
A measure of the bank disclosure is made on timely basis. Its value is an index of the average frequency and 
comprehensiveness of interim financial reports. 
 
A measure of the extent of supplementary information as required by countries’ banking regulation.  Its values are the 
principal component of variables in (iii) and (iv) above. 
 
 
 
A measure of the degree of legal sanctions against bank officials for nonperformance vis a vis the bank regulations. 
 
 
A measure of the degree to which external audits are independent, professional and rigorous as reflected in bank regulations 
governing audit practices.  The index is the principal component of five indicator variables:  (i) Compulsory Audit - a 
variable that takes 1 if external audit is compulsory in the country; (ii) Required Extent of Audit - a variable that assumes the 
value 1 if bank regulation sanctions the extent of the external audit; (iii) License Requirements - a variable that takes 1 if 
auditors are required to be licensed or certified; (iv) Auditor Report to Supervisor - a variable that takes 1 if auditors’ report 
should be given to the bank supervisory agency; and (v)Auditor Meet Supervisor without Consent of Bank -  a variable that 
takes 1 if the bank supervisory agency can meet the external auditors to discuss audit report without the consent of the bank 
auditee. 
  
A measure of the degree of legal sanctions against auditors in the case of nonperformance vis a vis the bank regulations. 
Control Variables:  
 
     Bank Concentration 
 
     
     Bank Competition 
 
 
     External Terms of Trade 
 
     Inflation  
  
     Per capita GDP 
 
 
The degree of concentration in the banking industry, measured as share of assets of the three largest banks in the country, 
averaged over the period 1990 through 1997.  
 
The degree of competitive conduct in the banking industry, measured as the sum of elasticities bank revenue to changes in 
input prices from Cleassens and Laeven (2004)  
 
The logarithm of the ratio of export price index to import price index for a country 
 
The logarithm of the average inflation rates 
 
The logarithm of real per capita GDP 
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